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I. INTRODUCTION: SEE THE FOREST THROUGH THE TREES
This article will resolve a conceptual conflict among the circuitswhen an attorney in trial is attacking the credibility of an admissible (and
admitted) out-of-court hearsay declaration, should the out-of-court
declarant be subject to impeachment with extrinsic evidence?
Attorneys are bestowed the power to control the tactics used in the
courtroom because their training and experience give them the requisite
knowledge to make informed strategic decisions.' In order to predict the
likelihood of success in court and assess the value of their case, an attorney
takes many things into consideration. One of those variables is often the
admissibility of evidence at trial. Although the predictability of the courts
and juries never has, and likely never will be, an exact science, the
admissibility of evidence is something that should remain consistent.
Unfortunately, inconsistent is the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to prove prior conduct for the impeachment of a non-testifying
hearsay declarant. 2
There is uncertainty surrounding whether Rule
608(b)-which bars attacking credibility with extrinsic evidence, such as
calling to the stand and asking questions of another witness-applies in
concert with Rule 806-which allows attacking the credibility of an out-ofcourt declarant-or if Rule 806 is its own rule of admissibility.3 There is a
circuit-split between the Second and Third Circuits on which the D.C.
Circuit has weighed.4 United States v. Saada5 , the most recent of these
1

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1983) (remarking client normally

defers to their lawyer's special knowledge and skill).
2 Compare FED. R. EvTD. 608 (restricting the presentation of extrinsic evidence on
credibility), with FED. R. EvD. 806 (granting litigators ability to introduce extrinsic evidence to
attack credibility).
3 See FED. R. EviD. 608 (barring the presentation of extrinsic evidence to attack credibility);
FED. R. EvD. 806 (allowing litigators to introduce evidence of out-of-court declarant's
credibility).
4 Compare United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988) (decreeing in
dicta that extrinsic evidence can prove prior conduct when impeaching a non-testifying hearsay
declarant), with United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (disallowing the
presentation of extrinsic evidence to prove prior conduct), and United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d
210, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2000) (parsing statutory language to determine that Rule 608(b)'s ban on
extrinsic evidence is appropriate).
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cases, was decided on May 15, 2000.6 These decisions have created more
problems than they have solved.
Extrinsic evidence should be permitted to impeach a non-testifying
hearsay declarant because the Federal Rules of Evidence should not destroy
what might be a party's only means of impeachment.7 Opinion or
reputation evidence is considerably less effective than evidence of specific
instances of conduct to show a witness's character for untruthfulness."
This holds true because, while opinion and reputation evidence are a third
party's perspective of an individual, specific instances of conduct are acts a
person made of their own volition, and are appropriately given more weight
by the trier of fact. 9 To ensure the reliability of extrinsic evidence,
safeguards exist such as good faith, Rule 403, and the hearsay exceptions
themselves.' 0
First, this article will explain the importance of Federal Rule of
Evidence 806 and the advantages of using it effectively. Second, it will
highlight the three-way circuit split that exists between the Second, Third,
and D.C. Circuits. Third, it will address why extrinsic evidence should be
permitted to impeach a non-testifying hearsay declarant's prior conduct
and, in turn, how this may affect a criminal defendant. Last, this article
will provide a solution to the contradictory intent and application of both
Rules 806 and 608(b). The most efficient and effective solution is to strike
the obsolete Rule 608(b) from the Federal Rules of Evidence and rely
suitably on Rule 403.

' 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000).
6 See id.at210.
7 See Friedman, 854 F.2d at 570 n.8 (explaining the application of Rules 608(b) and 806).
8 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note ("Of the three methods of proving
character... evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most convincing.").
9 See id. (stating that prior conduct is the most persuasive form of evidence).
10 See FED. R. EvID. 403 (establishing a balancing test that all evidence must pass before
introduction to jury); FED. R. EVID. 803 (enumerating the hearsay exceptions); see also
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 (1948) (recognizing that the trial justice correctly
evaluated prior specific instance before allowing inquiry on cross-examination); Abram v. Gerry,
672 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2012) (Tourella, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the court should allow
litigators to inquire into prior accusations in good faith); United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545,
552-53 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a cross-examiner needs a good faith basis before
introducing specific instances of conduct); United States v. Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 971 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996) (articulating that counsel needs a good faith factual basis
when inquiring into specific instances of conduct); KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS

§ 6:3, at 573 (6th ed. 2006). Preliminary proceedings should be

held prior to counsel asking "did you know" types of questions to give opposing counsel a forum
to oppose such a line of questioning. O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra, §6.3, at 574.
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II. WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW, CAN HURT YOU
A. What You Need To Know
To understand the operation of Rule 806, it is important first to
understand the fundamental components of testimony, impeachment, and
hearsay.
1. The testimony Zamboni-clearing the mud
Testimony consists of the statements made by a competent witness
on the witness stand under oath of affirmation." There are three forms in
which a statement may be made: (1) a person's oral assertion; (2) a
person's written assertion; or, (3) a person's nonverbal conduct that is
intended as an assertion. 1 2 Pointing after being asked a question is an
example of nonverbal conduct intended to be an assertion. 3 The pointer
conveys a message, an assertion, to another party.14 The person who makes
the statement or assertion is referred to as the declarant. 5
2. Impeachment is not very peachy
Impeachment is when an attorney discredits a witness by
questioning the witness's veracity, demonstrating that the individual is
unworthy of belief or the evidence is inaccurate or unreliable.1 6 For
example, in a civil or criminal trial, either party can offer character
evidence to impeach a testifying witness. One form of character evidence
is specific instances of past conduct involving dishonesty-something in
the person's background that suggests the person tends to speak or act
dishonestly.' Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, specific instances of
past conduct involving dishonesty are conduct other than a criminal

11 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1613 (9th ed. 2009).
12 See FED. R. EviD. 801(a) (describing what classifies as a statement).
13

See Richard B. Kuhns, Implied Assertions and the HearsayRule, 16 MISS C.L. REv. 139,

141 (1995) (explaining why the act of pointing constitutes a non-verbal assertion).
14 See id at 141-42 (illustrating how pointing is intended to substitute for an oral assertions).
15 See FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
16 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 820-21 (9th ed. 2009).
17 See In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp. v. Ensminger, No. 95-08203, 1998 WL 160036,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) . The evidence must also be relevant and conform with the other
rules pertaining to impeachment evidence. See id. (elaborating on the prerequisites required
before admitting evidence to the jury).
18 See FED. R. EviD. 608 (allowing certain character evidence before the jury).
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conviction-criminal convictions are governed by Rule 609.19 For
example, cheating on one's exam in law school would be a specific
instance of conduct that shows one's untrustworthiness.
3. Here, say anything you want
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered into evidence
"to prove the truth of the matter asserted., 20 Hearsay is not admissible
unless there is an exception because it is inherently unreliable. 2' In
addition to the hearsay exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide
parameters for out-of-court statements that are categorized as "not
hearsay. ,22 Exceptions are provided because some statements have
"guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the
declarant in person at the trial[.] 23 Some hearsay is necessary for the trier
of fact to make educated decisions based upon relevant reliable evidence.
4. The workings of 806
The Legislature, by enacting Rule 806, considered the issue of
whether a non-hearsay statement or hearsay exception could be used to
admit an out-of-court statement into evidence without the declarant's
appearance. 24 Rule 806-Attacking and Supporting the Declarant's
Credibility-provides that:
When a hearsay statement - or a statement described in
Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) - has been admitted in
evidence, the declarant's credibility may be attacked, and
then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible
for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a
witness. The court may admit evidence of a declarant's
inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it
occurred or whether the declarant had an opportunity to
explain or deny it. If the party against whom the statement
R. EviD. 609 (governing the use of criminal conviction).
See FED. R. EvID. 801(c)(1)-(2).
See FED. R. EviD. 802 (highlighting that exceptions are made by federal statute or by

19 See FED.
20
21

Supreme Court rules).

22 Compare FED. R. EviD. 801 (presenting a list of "non-hearsay" statements), with FED. R.
EviD. 803 (listing the true exceptions to the hearsay prohibition).
23 See FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee's note.
24 See FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (detailing the reasons why Congress

passed Rule 806).
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was admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party may
examine the declarant on the statement as if on cross25
examination.
Rule 806 attempts to level the playing field between the proponent
and opponent of an admitted hearsay statement.26 Pursuant to Rule 806, the
opponent to admitted hearsay has the liberty to attack the declarant's27
credibility as if the declarant took the stand and gave sworn testimony.
Rule 806 permits attacks on the credibility of the declarant of a hearsay
statement as if the declarant had testified.28
A declarant's credibility may be attacked by admitting into
evidence the declarant's convictions, bias or interest, character for
truthfulness, and inconsistent statements. 29 Rule 806 does not permit
impeachment of the declarant's statement when offered for a "non-truth"
purpose not expressly enumerated by the rule. 0 The Federal Rules of
Evidence considers a "non-truth" to be an exclusion from the hearsay rule,
rather than an exception.3 This means that the statement, although fitting
the description of hearsay, is not in fact hearsay.3 2 If counsel fails to object
to an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement, "it would appear ... [to]
trigg[er] the application of Rule 806 impeachment of... the declarant."3 3
Rule 608 allows for impeachment of a witness's character for
truthfulness, however, Rule 608(b) bars doing so by extrinsic evidence,
which includes
asking one witness about another person's past acts of
34
dishonesty:

25 FED. R. EVID. 806.

26 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 7 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID.

§ 806:1 (7th ed. 2012)

(explaining the purpose of Rule 806).
27 See ROBERT E. JONES, ET AL., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICAL GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL TRIAL
AND EVIDENCE §

8:3295 (2012) (stating opposing party's right to challenge a declarant's

credibility).
28 See United States v. Little, No. CR 08-0244 SBA, 2012 WL 2563796, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal.

June 28, 2012) (stating attacks on credibility are governed by Rule 806); see also United States v.
Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing that Rule 806 permits attacks on a hearsay
declarant's credibility as though the declarant testified).
29 See FED. R. EviD. 806 (allowing certain attacks on declarants).
30

See David Sonenshein, Impeaching the HearsayDeclarant,74 TEMP. L. REV. 163, 165-67

(2001) (explaining how to attack a declarant's credibility).
31 See FED. R. EviD. 801(d) (enumerating the non-hearsay exclusions rather than exceptions).
32 See id.
33 See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 167. This means that the opponent of a hearsay

statement can forgo an objection, and instead, impeach the out of court declarant as a tactical
means of introducing damaging evidence of the opposing party's witness. Id.
34United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness's conduct in order to attack or support the
witness's character for truthfulness. But the court may, on
cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they
are probative of the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of:
The witness; or
Another witness whose character the witness being crossexamined has testified about
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive
any privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that
relates only to the witness's character for truthfulness.35
Allowing the introduction of extrinsic evidence opens the door for
opposing counsel to offer extrinsic evidence to rebut the same, causing a
mini-trial within.3 6 Rule 608(b) bans extrinsic evidence to avoid "minitrials on peripheral or irrelevant matters" regarding prior acts.37 This is not
to be confused with impeachment by contradiction.38
Impeachment by contradiction allows extrinsic evidence to show
that prior "specific testimony" is false, while Rule 608(b) prohibits
extrinsic evidence that attacks a witness's credibility.39 Specific testimony
generally refers to testimony given under oath at a prior hearing or
proceeding. 40 Rules 806 and 608(b) intersect when the testifying witness
does not have knowledge of the prior conduct of the out-of-court declarant,

35 FED. R. EvID. 608(b); see Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 374 (baring the use of extrinsic

evidence to impeach a witness's character for truthfulness).
36See Brief for Appellant at 40 n.8, United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000)
(Nos. 99-5126, 99-5148) (arguing that the introduction of extrinsic evidence decreases judicial
efficiency).
37 O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10, at §6.3, at 575-76.
38 See id. (illustrating the differences between Rule 608(b) impeachment and impeachment
by contradiction).
39 See 15B WORDS AND PHRASES EXTRINSIC EViDENCE § 529-533 (2004 & Supp. 2014);

see also FED. R. EviD. 608(b) (declaring that all evidence other than testimony at trial is classified
as extrinsic evidence); United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining why impeachment by contradiction is important and how it can be used effectively);
United States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (revealing the limits on
introducing evidence through impeachment by contradiction); O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10,
at §6.3, at 576. Extrinsic evidence is evidence other than testimony given at trial. See FED. R.
EviD. 608(b); United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 87 (1st Cir. 2000) (declaring that all
evidence other than testimony at trial is extrinsic evidence).
40 See 0 MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10, at §6.3, at 575 n.39 (elaborating on what many
courts classify as "specific testimony").
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and the impeaching party wishes to introduce extrinsic evidence to show
the declarant's prior conduct involving dishonesty - although unrelated to
the substantive factual matters of consequence in the instant action. 4'
The language in Rule 806 does not specifically address its conflict
with Rule 608(b).42 There is one issue, however, that the Legislature
foresaw and corrected within the language of Rule 806. It surrounds Rule
613's requirement that a witness be afforded "the opportunity to admit or
deny a prior inconsistent statement before extrinsic evidence of that
statement may be introduced." 43 On its face, Rule 613's application poses
a problem because, by definition, Rule 806 allows for impeachment to take
place in the absence of the declarant.44 Rule 806's language fixes this
problem "by providing that evidence of the statement is not subject to any
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to
deny or explain. 4 ' However, Rule 806 does not provide any similar
exception for the unavailability of a hearsay declarant in the context of
Rule 608(b), thus creating a similar and equally problematic discrepancy in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 46
B. Why You Need To Know It
The admission of hearsay evidence may deprive a party of the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness, but evidence admitted as hearsay is
not protected from the test of impeachment. 47 Impeachment of the out-ofcourt hearsay declarant is an effective tool during trial but it is often
overlooked.48 When an attorney loses the battle to keep this type of
hearsay evidence out, the best alternative is to impeach the non-testifying

41

Compare FED. R. EVID. 608 (limiting the introduction of extrinsic evidence to attack

credibility), with FED. R. EVID. 806 (allowing litigators to use extrinsic evidence to attack
credibility).
42 See FED. R. EvID. 806.
43 United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000).
44 See FED. R. EVID. 806 (giving counsel the opportunity to impeach the non-testifying

hearsay declarant).
41 Saada, 212 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining applicability of
Rule 806); see FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (codifying the Congressional intent
behind Rule 806's passage).
46 See Saada, 212 F.3d at 222 (declaring that Rule 806 does not provide a similar exception);
see also ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, 5A N.Y. PRAC., EVIDENCE IN N.Y.
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 8:96 (2013) (explaining New York's application of Rule 806).
47 See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at §8.96.
48 See KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 806.2 (5th ed. 2012) (detailing the importance of impeachment to litigators).
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hearsay declarant. 4 9 This is a critical opportunity for the hearsay opponent

because he can damage the declarant's credibility. 50 Although these battles
shape the evidence placed before the jury, the jury decides the war when
weighing the evidence and assessing a declarant's credibility as well as the
ultimate outcome of the case.
III. IF YOU DON'T USE IT, YOU CAN'T ABUSE IT

A. The Black Pearl:Rare Beauty
Impeaching the non-testifying hearsay declarant is an important
trial tactic that is little-known and underused. Scholars have suggested that
most attorneys believe, "impeachment is ordinarily [only] performed on
cross-examination of a witness who has appeared and testified on direct
examination." 5 This premise is supported by the infrequent number of
appellate decisions in which courts have addressed Rule 806
controversies. 52 Even less frequently appealed is whether the ban on
extrinsic evidence imposed by Rule 608(b) applies under a Rule 806
interrogation.53 Rarely does a court decide whether to admit extrinsic
evidence to show prior conduct during a Rule 806 impeachment, because it
is so seldom used by attorneys.54

49 See id. at § 806.2 n.3 (citing Anthony M. Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Art of
Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L. REv. 157, 158-59 (1991)) (illustrating the
tactics available to attorneys in many scenarios).
50 See id.
51 See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 163 (describing the misconceived notion of

impeachment).
52 See West Law Search, WEST LAW NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com, (access Federal Rules
of Evidence Rule 806; then click "Citing References" on top banner; then click "Cases" on the
side banner) (last accessed January 11, 2015). The Westlaw citing references for Rule 806 yields
26 "Highest Court" and 353 "Other Court" cases. See id.When cross referenced with "608(b)"
using the "Locate" function, there are only 26 cases total that are found as of January 11, 2015.
See id. (access Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 806; then click "Citing References" on top
banner; then click "Cases" on the side banner; then type "608(b)" into the "Search within results"
toolbar) (last accessed January 11, 2015).
53 See supra text accompanying note 52.
54 See Interview with Senior Judge Jeffrey T. Miller, United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with
Senior Judge Jeffrey T Miller]; Interview with Senior Judge Thomas J. Whelan, United States
District Court for the Southern District of California, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 5, 2013)
[hereinafter Interview with Senior Judge Thomas J. Whelan]; Interview with Judge Cathy Ann
Bencivengo, United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in San Diego,
Cal. (Feb. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo]; Interview with
Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford, United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, in San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 24, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with MagistrateJudge Karen
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To demonstrate how rarely attorneys impeach a non-testifying
hearsay declarant, we can analyze in comparison the widely used
provisions of Rule 804." 5 Contrasting Rule 806 and Rule 804-Exceptions
to the Rule Against Hearsay, When the Declarant Is Unavailable as a
Witness-the number of citing references pale in comparison; there are 6
times the number of trial motions, memoranda, and affidavits; 8 times the
number of appellate briefs; and, 13 times the number of cases.56 This is a
shocking realization considering that in most instances where hearsay is
admitted into evidence, Rule 806 can be used.

S Crawford]. Judge Miller served as a deputy state attorney general of California from 19681987. Interview with Senior Judge Jeffrey T Miller,supra. Judge Miller served as a judge on the
California Superior Court for San Diego County from 1987-1997. Id. Judge Miller became a
federal judge in 1997 and obtained "Senior" status in 2010. Id. Judge Whelan served as a deputy
district attorney of San Diego, California from 1969-1989. Interview with Senior Judge Thomas
J. Whelan, supra. Judge Whelan was a judge in the Superior Court of California in San Diego
County from 1990-1998. Id. Judge Whelan was then appointed to District Court for the Southern
District of California, taking "Senior" status in 2010. Id. Judge Bencivengo joined a predecessor
to the law firm DLA Piper in 1988. Interview with Judge CathyAnn Bencivengo, supra. Judge
Bencivengo became partner in 1996 and stayed at this firm until 2005 when she was nominated as
a federal magistrate judge for the Southern District of California. Id. Judge Bencivengo became
a United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of California in 2012. Id.
Magistrate Judge Crawford worked as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Civil Division
of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California. Interview with Magistrate
Judge Karen S Crawford, supra. Magistrate Judge Crawford also worked as a trial attorney with
the United States Department of Justice. Id. Then, Magistrate Judge Crawford made partner with
Duane Morris, LLP in San Diego, California. Id. Magistrate Judge Crawford became a
magistrate judge in 2012. Id. Federal District Court Judges Cathy Ann Bencivengo, Thomas J.
Whelan, Jeffrey T. Miller, and Federal Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford, inter alia, have
never dealt with the issue in their court rooms. See supra text accompanying.
55 Compare FED. R. EvD. 806 (attacking and supporting a declarant's credibility), with FED.
R. EVID. 804 (illustrating the exception to rules of evidence when declarant is unavailable as
witness).
56 Compare supra text accompanying note 52, with West Law Search, WEST LAW NEXT,
http://next.westlaw.com, (access Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 804; then click "Citing
References" on top banner; then observe the side banner for statistics) (last accessed January 11,
2015).
Highest Court Other
Appellate
Appellate
Trial Motions,
(consisting of Court
Briefs
Petitions,
Memoranda &
U.S.S.C.
and
Motions
& Affidavits
State Supreme
Filings
Courts)
Rule 806
26
353
571
17
1197
Rule 806 & 1
25
49
1
296
608(b)
Rule 804
391
4540
4352
201
7262
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B. A Pearlof Wisdom
Even if the Rule 608(b) hurdle is cleared, ignoring the benefits of
Rule 806 is a missed opportunity. For example, consider an undercover
police officer who in a later criminal trial recounts statements made by an
unwitting source other than the accused, such as another member of the
criminal enterprise. A savvy defense attorney should cross-examine the
officer about the unsavory past of the "source," a snitch of sorts. It is a
win-win.
Either the officer knew of-but did not reveal on direct
examination-the source's dishonest past and so the officer seems to be
trying to fool the jury by vouching for the source as credible, or the officer
never checked into the source's past before representing the source to the
jury as credible and so the officer simply seems foolish. Presuming the
officer doesn't know the dishonest conduct of the source, defense counsel
should be allowed to prove it by means of extrinsic evidence, subject to the
rigors of Rule 403.
Although Rule 806 is rarely used during trial and more seldom
appealed, the following three cases
have created a split of authority in the
57
Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits.
IV. THE RESULTING SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
A. UnitedStates v. Friedman(1988)
The Second Circuit became the first circuit court to address the
quandary that arises at the intersection of Rules 806 and 608(b) in United
States v. Friedman.58 The Second Circuit did not reach the issue of
whether extrinsic evidence was admissible because they affirmed the lower
court's decision to exclude it pursuant to Rule 403, making any further
inquiry unnecessary. 59 In dicta, however, the court provided that extrinsic
evidence would have been permissible had it not failed the Rule 403
60
balancing test.

57 Compare United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988) (declaring
through dicta that extrinsic evidence can prove prior conduct when impeaching a non-testifying
hearsay declarant), with United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (prohibiting
the presentation of extrinsic evidence to prove prior conduct), and United States v. Saada, 212
F.3d 210, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2000) (dissecting statutory language to determine whether Rule
608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence is appropriate).
58 854 F.2d 535, 535 (2d Cir. 1988) (addressing the rarely appealed issue of the interplay

between Rules 806 and 608(b)).
59 See id. at 570 (showing that Rule 403 is the appropriate standard).
60 See id. at 570 n.8 (developing limits on the admittance of extrinsic evidence); see also
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In this case, the jury found that defendant Friedman, inter alia,
used the New York City Parking Violations Bureau to collect bribes and
kickbacks in a racketeering operation that resulted in "a cesspool of
corruption." 6' In that pool was Donald Manes, a political figure in New
York City, rising from Councilman to Queens Borough President and then
Chairman of the Queens Democratic Committee. 62 Manes' position of
power allowed him to be a key player in the conspiracy. 63 By the time the
case was brought to trial, Manes was unavailable due to his suicide in the
Spring of 1986.64
Prior to his suicide, and aware of the investigation implicating his
involvement, Manes was seen driving recklessly while bleeding from slash
wounds on his left wrist and ankle. 65 Manes first explained that his wounds
were inflicted by two men who hid in the rear seat of his automobile and
abducted him.66 He later recanted, admitting his wounds were self-inflicted
from an attempted suicide.67 In March of 1986, two months after his
attempted suicide, Manes killed himself making him unavailable for trial. 68
Geoffrey Lindenaur, a chief witness for the government, testified to
hearsay statements made by Manes that were admitted into evidence
against the defendant as "declarations of a co-conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy[.] ' 69 The defendant attempted to offer testimony of the
Assistant District Attorney, to whom Manes had originally lied, together
with a videotape of Manes admitting to his self-inflicted harm. 70 The
district court declined to allow the defendant to introduce evidence that
Manes had initially lied to law-enforcement authorities regarding his
attempted suicide. 71 The court reasoned that the evidence had no probative
value and might confuse the jury .72Confusion of the jury is a problem that

FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice).
61 Friedman, 854 F.2d at 541.
62 Id. at 543.
63 Id. at 542-43.
64 United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 543 (2d Cir. 1988).
65 Id. at 569.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 553.
69 See Friedman, 854 F.2d at 543, 569. Geoffrey Lindenauer falsely claimed to hold a
Doctor of Philosophy to operate an unprofitable "sham psychotherapy institute," which he used to
have sex with his patients. See id. at 543.
70 United States v.Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569 (2d Cir. 1988).
71 Id. at 569-70.
72 Id. (affirming the trial court judge's sustaining of Rule 403 objections).
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Rule 403 directly addresses and seeks to avoid.73
On appeal, the Second Circuit found the evidence was "properly
excluded because it was simply not probative on the issue of the credibility
of Manes's conspiratorial statements to Lindenauer., 74 The Second Circuit
found that the trial court had not erred in finding that Manes' false account
of attempted suicide was
not probative to the credibility of the statements
75
against the defendant.
Although the Second Circuit found no occasion to address the issue
of whether extrinsic evidence can be used to prove specific instances of
conduct for the purposes of attacking or supporting credibility, the court
provided guidance in dicta. 76 The court noted that Rule 608(b) limits such
evidence to cross-examination.77 More importantly, in a footnote, the court
stated that "Rule 806 applies .

.

. when the declarant has not testified and

there has by definition been no cross-examination, and resort[ing] to
extrinsic evidence may be the only means of presenting such evidence to
the jury.', 78 This means that in the Second Circuit, a litigator can use
extrinsic evidence to prove prior conduct when impeaching a non-testifying
hearsay declarant through Rule 806. 79
B. UnitedStates v. White (1997)
The D.C. Circuit arrived at a different result in United States v.
White,80 deciding that an inquiry into prior conduct is permissible, but
extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted to prove prior conduct.8 '
In White, defendant Ronald Hughes joined the First Street Crew
street gang and began selling crack cocaine with defendant Antone White
and others.8 2 Thereafter, Arvell Williams, an acquaintance of White, went
to the Assistant United States Attorney's Office and offered to assist in the
investigation of the First Street Crew.83 Pursuant to his arrangement with

73 FED. R. EVID. 403 (seeking to avoid, inter alia, "confusing the issues [and] misleading the

jury.").
74 Friedman, 854 F.2d at 569.
71 Id. at 570.
76

United States v. Friedman_ 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988).

77 See id. at 570 n.8.
78 Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375 (E.D.N.Y.

2008) (applying a similar test as the Friedmancourt).
79 See Friedman, 854 F.2d at 570.
80 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
"' Id. at 9 2 0 .
82 Id. at 909.
83 id.
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law enforcement, Williams wore a wire and purchased crack from several
members of the First Street Crew.84 White grew suspicious of Williams,
suspecting that he was working with the police.85 After two months as an
informant, Williams arranged to accompany Sergeant Sutherland, an
undercover officer with the Metropolitan Police Department, in the
86
purchase of crack cocaine from two members of the First Street Crew.8 7
The following day Williams was shot sixteen times, resulting in his death.
Defendant Hughes, inter alia, was charged in a twenty-six-count
indictment with murdering Williams as well as other firearm and drug
related charges.88 Hughes was sentenced to life in prison on the drug
conspiracy and sentenced to 240 months on each of three drug distribution
counts with all sentences running concurrently.89
During the course of trial, Sergeant Sutherland testified to his
involvement. 90 Through his testimony, Williams' out-of-court statements
were admitted against Hughes. 91 The court allowed this testimony because
the Government had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Hughes conspired to murder Williams; thereby, causing Williams'
unavailability and thus, waiving
Hughes' right to confrontation and any
92
potential hearsay objections.
Sergeant Sutherland was cross-examined regarding Williams' prior
93
conduct.
of
and
rior The •scope
.
,,94 his cross-exam included "drug use, drug dealing,
and prior convictions.
The court prohibited questions about whether
Williams had made false statements on an employment application and

84

Id.
" White, 116 F.3d at 909.
86 United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87 id.
"" Id. at 910.
89Id. at 910-11. Two

sentences that run concurrent run at the same time, as opposed to a
sentence running consecutively, one after the other. See Rachel A. Mills, Comment, Too Many
Cooks Spoil the Sentence: FragmentationofAuthority in Federaland State Sentencing Schemes,
41 SETON HALL L. REv. 1637, 1640 (2011) (explaining the difference between concurrent and

consecutive sentences).
9' White, 116 F.3d at 920.
91 Id. at 910.
92

See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him..."). The preponderance of the evidence

standard requires that the trier of fact is "persuaded that something is more likely true than not
true." 2 NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS § 59:36 (2012); see United
States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (developing reasons why evidence was
allowed before the jury).
9' White, 116 F.3d. at 920.
94 Id. at 920.
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whether he had violated court orders in the past. 95 The court reasoned that,
even if permitted to ask such questions, Sutherland barely knew Williams
and was unlikely capable of answering them. 96 The D.C. Circuit reversed
and concluded that this line of questioning was permitted, but counsel
"could not have made reference to any extrinsic proof of those acts. 9 7 The
court defined "extrinsic evidence" as evidence that is extrinsic to the
witness on the stand, not the out-of-court declarant. 98 For example,
documentation of an out-of-court eye-witness's drug use or drug dealing
could not be used to show such conduct, but similar questions could be
asked. Had the White court used a strict interpretation of extrinsic
evidence, the testifying witness could not be asked questions about the outof-court declarant's conduct, because the testifying witness would be
extrinsic evidence. 99
C. United States v. Saada (2000)
In United States v. Saada, the Third Circuit held that the plain
reading of Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence is incorporated into the
rule by the language in Rule 806.100 Saada centered on a fraudulent
insurance claim from the staged flooding of a warehouse. 1 1 The
defendants, Isaac Saada and Neil Saada, operated a business that dealt in
high end "ivory, jewels, gold and other materials.'' ° In August of 1990,
the Saadas were in financial duress due to litigation. 10 3 They settled the
lawsuit, agreeing to pay $3.8 million on a debt for which the Saadas were
both personally liable. 10 4 On November 28, 1990, Neil broke a sprinkler
head and caused a flood in an area containing the company's most valuable

95 Id.

96 See id; see also GRAHAM, supra note 26, at §806:1 (displaying the problems created by
allowing a witness with insufficient knowledge to testify).
97 See White, 116 F.3d at 920 (relying on Rule 608(b)).

The court also concluded that
because of the damage previously administered to William's credibility, the trial court's
conclusion that subsequent questioning was of "little utility" was within its discretion. Id.
98 United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

99 See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note (interpreting extrinsic evidence); see

also White 116 F.3d at 920 (applying relaxed interpretation of extrinsic evidence).
100 See United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000) (reconciling the interplay
between Rules 608(b) and 806).
101 Id. at 214.

102 Id. at 213-14. Isaac Saada and his son Neil Saada were both on trial in this case. Id. at
213. They were both convicted of conspiracy to defraud an insurance company, mail fraud, and
wire fraud. Id.
103 Saada, 212 F.3d at 214.
104 Id. (explaining the defendant's settlement and subsequent bankruptcy filing).
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merchandise, destroying the contents therein. 105
When police and
firefighters arrived on the scene Neil told them the sprinkler head
accidently broke while moving a heavy box on the top of a stack of
boxes

16

During trial, one of Saadas's employees, Linda Chewing, testified
that during the flood Tom Yaccarino was heard "screaming words to the
effect of 'oh my God, Neil did something stupid, [threw] something, now
he has got a mess ... I can't believe it. He is so stupid. He threw it. He is
stupid, he is dumb."" 0 7 Tom Yaccarino was a former judge and vicepresident of the Saadas's company. 08 Yaccarino died before the trial. 10 9
The government sought to impeach Yaccarino's credibility and attack his
statement by introducing evidence and factual support of Yaccarino's
"removal from the bench and disbarment for unethical conduct[.] "" 0 The
defendants objected, claiming that "the credibility of a hearsay declarant
may not be impeached with extrinsic evidence of bad acts," pursuant to
Rule 608(b)."'
The Third Circuit ruled that this objection was valid and that Rule
608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence to prove prior bad acts is not modified
by Rule 806 "even when those declarants are unavailable to testify.,, 1 12 The
Saada court reasoned that because the witness testifying to the hearsay
statement may still be questioned on cross-examination, the exclusion of
extrinsic evidence during cross-examination is negligible." 3 The Saada
court concluded that Rule 806 does not make a specific exception to
accommodate for the unavailability of a witness, and thus the ban on
extrinsic evidence pursuant to Rule 608(b) is enforceable." 4 Presuming
Linda Chewing doesn't know about Tom Yaccarino's questionable past,
the government is left with a very weak impeachment of his credibility.

Id.
United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2000).
107 Id. at 218.
108 Id. The name of the business was Scrimshaw Handicrafts, located in New Jersey. Id. at
105
106

214.
109 Id. at 218.
110 Saada, 212 F.3d at 219.
111Id.
112 United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000).
11'See id.
114 See id. (comparing how Rule 806's language addresses the conflict that arises when used
with Rule 613 but not Rule 608(b)).
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D. Synthesize the Splitting Sides
The aforementioned decisions have caused an unwarranted circuit
split regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Second Circuit and
courts within its jurisdiction have examined the footnote in Friedman and
decided that extrinsic evidence is admissible, whereas other courts have
sided with White and Saada, reasoning that Rule 608(b)'s language governs
without exception. 115 However, what the courts fail to realize is that Rule
608(b) and Rule 403 seek to avoid the same complications-confusing the
issues and an undue consumption of time-ideals that are already expressly
addressed and prohibited by Rule 403.116
Rule 403 provides that:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 117
Rule 608(b) can be eliminated from the Federal Rules of Evidence
because Rules 403 and 608(b) serve the same purpose.118 Striking Rule
608(b) would eradicate the circuit split and clarify the threshold that
extrinsic evidence of prior conduct must surpass-Rule 403.

115 See United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing footnote in
Friedmanfor authority to admit extrinsic evidence during Rule 806 impeachment). But see State
v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1174, 1180-81 (Vt. 2008) (holding that extrinsic evidence is not appropriate
to show prior conduct); see also Taylor v. State, 963 A.2d 197, 212 (Md. 2009) (citing the Saada
decision generally); State v. Martisko, 566 S.E.2d 274, 280-81 (W.Va 2002) (deciding that
extrinsic evidence is not permissible to show prior conduct).
116 See FED. R. EvlD. 403 (codifying the balancing test courts use when deciding a piece of
evidence's admissibility); FED. R. EviD. 608 advisory committee's note (offering insights into
why Rule 608 was codified by Congress); 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 979, at 823-26 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (enumerating the reasons for excluding
extrinsic evidence); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of
Impeaching the Non-testifying Declarant,56 OHIO ST. L.J. 495, 523-24 (1995) (declaring that the
risk of confusing the issues is the primary reason for excluding extrinsic evidence); William G.
Hale, Specific Acts and Related Matters as Affecting Credibility, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 89, 89-90
(1950) (reasoning appropriate to exclude extrinsic evidence because of "(1) confusion of issues;
(2) undue consumption of time; (3) unfair surprise"); see also Saada, 212 F.3d at 222
(acknowledging that decision does not address all issues related to interplay between Rules 608
and 403); United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038
(1992) (stating that the purpose of Rule 608(b) is to avoid mini-trials); accord United States v.
Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1992); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir.
1960).
117 FED. R. EvID. 403.
118 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (limiting the evidence allowed before a trier of fact); FED. R. EVID.

608(b) (creating the framework to limit evidence allowed before a trier of fact).
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V. PROVING THE WRONG APPROACH
A. The Legislative Intent
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted to address the issues
that arise when a witness testifies in court. 119 For example, when Rule 609
was debated and enacted by Congress, it was presumed that Rule 608(b)
120
would only allow for impeachment of a witness testifying in court.
Moreover, it is clear that Rule 608 was drafted with the same
understanding-that it would be used to impeach a testifying witness
regarding specific instances of conduct.' 2' This logic is cemented by the
drafter's language, providing that specific instances of conduct can "be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness.' 22 Several judges
23
similarly believe that Rule 608(b) is limited to a testifying declarant.
In contrast, Rule 806 presumes that the declarant will not testify in
court. 124 This presumption is valid because Rule 806 was codified under
the hearsay section of the Federal Rules of Evidence under the presumption
that the statements were made out of court.125 Rule 806 requires the
declarant's absence from court. 1 26 When evidence rules pertaining to
witnesses were drafted, the drafters presumed that the witness would testify
in court. 1 2 7 Therefore, when impeachment rules are used in concert with
Rule 806, "they are being used in a context very different from that
envisioned[.] ' ,1 28 These competing interests clash when Rule 806 is used to
impeach an out-of-court hearsay declarant, and rules created on the premise
119 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 497 (discussing how the Federal Rules of Evidence are
interpreted based on legislative intent).
120 See 120 CONG. REc. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); 120 CONG. REC. 2377 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Dennis).
121 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 521-22 (discussing the purpose behind Rule 608(b)
allowing for impeaching a testifying witness); see also FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's
note (revealing the Congressional intent behind enacting Rule 608).
122 Cordray, supra note 116, at 521-22 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing FED. R. EvuD. 608(b)).
123 See Interview with Senior Judge Thomas J. Whelan, supra note 54; see also Interview
with Senior Judge Jeffrey T Miller, supra note 54.
124 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 497 (discussing the different legislative intent behind
Rule 806 and the other rules of evidence).
125 See FED. R. EVD. 806(c)(1)-(2) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered for
its truth).
126 See FED. R. EVID. 806.
127 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 497 (discussing the premise of evidence rules regarding

witnesses).
128

See id. (explaining how legislative intent alters the interpretation of the Federal Rules of

Evidence).
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of an in-court declarant are applied.
The Legislature cannot anticipate every hypothetical; hence, it may
take many reformulations before the rules convey the Legislature's
intent. 129 For example, Rule 608(b) was amended effective December 1,
2003, changing the rule's language to ban evidence addressing "character
for truthfulness" rather than "credibility," thereby narrowing 0 the
restriction's scope to the parameters that Congress originally intended.13
Originally, Rule 608(b) intended to bar extrinsic evidence related
only to the witness's veracity. 131 Extrinsic evidence offered for other forms
of impeachment, such as contradiction, prior inconsistent statement, bias,
and mental capacity, is governed by other rules and was not intended to be
controlled by Rule 608(b). 132 Moreover, extrinsic evidence may be used to
show "prejudice, interest and corruption, perception . . .prior criminal

convictions, character for dishonesty[J" and inaccurate memory.133
B. The Legislative Loophole

"[T]he only avenue for admitting information of prior bad acts to
impeach the credibility of a witness-cross-examination-is closed if the
hearsay declarant cannot be called to testify[J" and if the witness does not
have personal knowledge. 34 A ban on extrinsic evidence may require the

party against whom the hearsay statement was admitted to call the
declarant to the stand. 135 The party admitting the statement is given
significant power and the hearsay opponent is left without any reasonable
recourse 136
129

Laws and regulations are constantly being amended to further the original intent of the

legislature or to correct interpretations that have strayed too far in the wrong direction.
130 See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note. To clarify its original intent, the
Legislature amended the language, narrowing the scope to only "character for truthfulness." Id.

The phrasing "credibility" was too broad and spawned varied decisions and interpretations. See
O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10, at § 6:3, at 575 n.39.

131 See FED. R. EviD. 608 (amended 2003); see also FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory
committee's note ("stating that the Rule is '[in conformity with Rule 405, which forecloses use
of evidence of specific instances as proof in chief of character unless character is in issue in the
case ...').
132 See FED. R. EviD. 608 (amended 2003) (referencing Rules 402 and 403); O'MALLEY, ET
AL., supra note 10, at §6.3, at 578-79 n.41 (detailing the intended scope of Rule 608(b)).
133 See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 166.
134 See United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing the
importance

of impeachment with prior conduct but ultimately finding that argument

unpersuasive).

Id.
136 See id.(identifying the injustices created by inappropriately applying Rules 608 and 806
135

in concert).
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Excluding extrinsic evidence for prior conduct provides an
opportunity for the hearsay proponent to avoid calling the declarant to the
stand, thereby avoiding even the potential for credibility and impeachment
issues. 3 7 If the declarant is unavailableto testify, the hearsay proponent is
again advantaged because they can prevent the use of impeachment
evidence regarding prior misconduct "unless the witness testifying to the
hearsay has knowledge of the declarant's misconduct[,j" 38 which is often
unlikely. 3 9
Moreover, if the declarant is available to testify, the
40
opponent's only option is to call the declarant as a hostile witness.
Although the Third Circuit decided that the "plain language" of Rule
608(b) bans extrinsic evidence, it also acknowledged that the decision
banned a form of impeachment.' 4' The courts should not limit counsel's
ability to impeach, and invariably control the tactical approach of the trial.
VI. PRESERVE IMPEACHMENT
Regularly, the hearsay opponent will not be able to cross-examine
the declarant because the declarant never takes the stand. 142 Rightfully,

courts are hesitant to protect a non-testifying hearsay declarant from
impeachment. 143 It is important to cross-examine the declarant to put the
credibility and reliability of the admitted hearsay in question. 144 Such an
inquiry requires the rule to be modified to allow extrinsic evidence in

137

See Cordray, supra note 116, at 526 ('[I]f a party felt that a witness was vulnerable to

attack under Rule 608(b), that party might attempt to insulate the witness from this form of
impeachment by offering his out-of-court statements, rather than calling him to testify.").
138 Saada, 212 F.3d at 222; see generally 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 511 n.7 (2d ed. 1994); Cordray,

supra note 116, at 525,

530.

139 It is unlikely that the testifying witness knows the prior conduct of the declarant because
many of the hearsay exceptions and qualifying hearsay exclusions pertain to situations where
people are not in a close relationship with each other. For example, present sense impressions
and excited utterances are often heard at a car accident or other event where people do not know
each other. Moreover, exceptions to hearsay are made for certain documents based upon their
inherent reliability, but people that testify to those documents, often coworkers, do not likely
know their coworkers prior conduct.
140 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 525-26 (advising litigators of the limited options if the
declarant is available to testify).
141 See United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting the broad
implications of the decision).

142 See TEGLAND, supra note 48, at §806.2.
143 See ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION

§ 2.6, at 87 (2012) (explaining the court's reluctance to

shield the declarant from impeachment).
144 See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at §8.96 (suggesting the importance of crossexamination).
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support of the declarant's bad acts. 45 When offered to prove prior bad
acts, Rule 806 should be interpreted to modify Rule 608(b)'s ban on
extrinsic evidence. 46 This avoids47 eliminating an effective, powerful and
imperative form of impeachment. 1
14 8

A. The Hidden Credibility Trick

The hearsay opponent is disadvantaged when denied the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 149 Interrogating a witness
specifically and repeatedly about specific instances of conduct is a potent
impeachment tool, allowing counsel to convey suspicion and doubt to the
jury. 150 The reliability of evidence is premised upon confrontation:
"physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor
by the trier of fact. ' , 151 "[N]ervousness cannot be shown from a cold
transcript[.] 'i 152 The jury's observation of a witness's demeanor on cross

examination is critical to assess the witness's credibility.153 The trier of
fact should be exposed to not only the demeanor of the witness, but the
"nervousness, expressions, and other body language" of the testifying
witness. 154 The trial court observes the "verbal and nonverbal behavior...
145

See id. (assessing whether to modify the rule and allow extrinsic evidence to support a

declarant's bad acts).
146 See Saada, 212 F.3d at 221 (interpreting Rule 806 as modifying Rule 608(b)).
147 See id.
148 See DEREK ZUMSTEG, THE CHEATER'S GUIDE TO BASEBALL 63-65 (2004). This is a
play-on-words based upon the well-known baseball term, the hidden ball trick. Id. The hidden
ball trick is executed when a defenseman hides the ball, generally in his glove, palm or armpit,
while the pitcher pretends to have it. See id. If the runner steps off of the base the defenseman
with the "hidden ball" tags him out. Id.
149 See FED. R. EvD. 806 (leveling the playing field between parties by exposing hearsay
declarants to impeachment). Although the predicate of having the hearsay exceptions is that there
is no cross-examination, courts overlook this disadvantage because of the statement's reliability.
Id.
150 See 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 306, at
245 (1979) (stating that admissions are not necessary, as questions are enough caution to the

jury).
151 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 837 (1990) (explaining the central purpose behind
the Confrontation Clause).
152 See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479 (2008) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 942
So.2d 484, 496 (La. 2008)); United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining the value of observing a witness testify over merely reading a transcript).

153 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 837, 845-46 (explaining what the Confrontation
Clause provides beyond that of a "personal examination"); see also Snyder, 552
U.S. at 490 (expressing the importance of observing demeanor firsthand).
154 See Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hamilton,

107 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1997)) (proposing that physical presence enhances the accuracy of
fact finding).
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reactions and responses ... facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye
contact, posture, and body movements . . ." of those whom testify before
it. 155 Recognizing the value and weight of observing first-hand testimony,
56

appellate courts defer to the trier of fact for determinations of credibility. 1

It is imbalanced for an out-of-court declarant to remain more

credible than the testifying witness because the declarant had the luxury of
not facing personal impeachment and exposure of his character flaws.1 57 A
hearsay opponent that does not have the opportunity to impeach the
declarant with specific instances of conduct "is clearly worse off than... if

her opponent had called the declarant to testify[J" because the jury does
not ascertain the emotions or hear the declarant's responses first-hand. 15
B. Be There Or Be Square
In person cross-examination is an important tool at trial, but it is
unavailable when the declarant does not testify. 159 The declarant's
credibility should be exposed to the rigors of impeachment as though that
person testified. 160 The jury should have the opportunity to evaluate the

declarant's credibility to the same extent as a witness who testifies in
court. 16 1 "[T]he proper place for a challenge to a witness's credibility is in
cross-examination and in subsequent argument to the jury[.]', 162 A jury
should weigh the witness's credibility when evaluating the evidence. 63
When Rule 806 is used to impeach the non-testifying hearsay

155 See United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Eddy, 8 F.3d 577, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1993)); Lakich, 23 F.3d at 1210-11 (addressing the factors
assessed by viewing the declarant in person).
156 See Nobles, 69 F.3d at 181 (allowing a trier of fact to determine credibility rather than
appellate court because the appellate court is not in an appropriate position).
157 See PARK & LIINGER, supra note 143, at §2.6 (explaining that it is unfair to allow the
declarant to avoid impeachment and remain credible).
158 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 525.
159 See Brief for Appellant at 39, United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nos.

99-5126, 99-5148) (stating a court must judge the witness's demeanor). The trier of fact
considers not only the attorneys demeanor and arguments, but more importantly, the demeanor of
the witnesses that take the stand and offer testimony. See generally id.
160 See JONES, ET AL., supra note 27, at §8:3296 (reasoning that the out-of-court declarant
should face character and impeachment testimony).
161 See FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note (establishing that the declarant's
credibility should be evaluated to the same degree as an in-court witness).
162 See United States v. Truman, 762 F. Supp. 2d 437, 449 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (revealing the importance of a witness's credibility to
a case's outcome).
163 See Truman, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (advising the jury to factor credibility into
the
evidence's weight).
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declarant, the hearsay opponent cannot induce the declarant to admit to his
prior specific acts or inquire about prior specific acts that could impeach
the declarant's credibility.1 64 The hearsay proponent is advantaged by Rule
806 and incentivized to proffer hearsay evidence rather than a live
witness's testimony from the hearsay declarant. 165 Scholars have opined
that, "theadmisionof
law harsa
of evidence"" should
,,166not provide incentives for the proffer and
admission of hearsay evidence.
The trier of fact should be given every
opportunity to exercise its discretion and analysis of a live witness. It is
unfair to prohibit extrinsic evidence when the declarant cannot be
67
confronted about the untruthful acts for which they are being impeached. 1
The declarant's absence
from court complicates this already difficult form
68
of impeachment. 1
"Rule 806 should be read as modifying . . . Rule [608(b)] . . . [by]
permitting extrinsic evidence of ... misconduct.', 169 Requiring otherwise
would unfairly force the attacking party to call the out-of-court declarant to
the stand despite his opponent having introduced the statement giving rise
to the attack.170 Even worse, if the declarant is unavailable the impeaching

party may be left with no other device for introducing relevant
impeachment evidence.' 7' Irrespective of the declarant's availability, the
impeaching party should not be forced to call the declarant if his opponent
solicited the statement that is being impeached. 172 The result is unfair.
In Saada, the Third Circuit justified their decision to ban the
introduction of extrinsic evidence pursuant to Rule 608(b), in part, by
164 See ROGER

C. PARK,

TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK,

§ 4:87, at 4-223-24 (2nd ed. 2002)

(illustrating how litigators utilize non-testifying hearsay declarants to their advantage).
165 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 526 (concluding practitioners gain no advantage by using
a live witness); see also Alan D. Homstein, On the Horns of an Evidentiary Dilemma: The
Intersection of Federal Rules of Evidence 806 and 608(b), 56 ARK. L. REv. 543, 570 (2003)
("But where the hearsay declarant has engaged in conduct that might cast doubt on her veracity,
Rule 806 leaves a lacuna that can serve to privilege hearsay over in-court testimony.").
166 See Hornstein, supra note 165, at 570 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence should
not entice lawyers to offer hearsay evidence).
167 See PARK & LININGER, supra note 143, at §2.6, at 85-86 (discussing the opportunity to
confront declarant about untruthful acts); see also United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372,
375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (allowing the defendants to attack a non-testifying individual's veracity by
reading documents to the jury pursuant to their Fifth Amendment rights).
168 See PARK & LININGER, supra note 143, at §2.6, 85-87 (presenting difficult scenarios
often encountered by courts and a litigators approach to those scenarios).
169 See United States v. Finley, No. 87 CR 364-1, 1989 WL 58223, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. May
19, 1989) (citation omitted) (holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant
to credibility).
170 See id.at *1 (developing issues presented by alternate reading of statutory interplay).
171 id.
172 See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 150, at §501, at 1241 (advocating that Rule 806
should permit extrinsic evidence of misconduct).
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relying on the other means of impeachment that the opponent has
available .173 The Saada court was persuaded by the potential use of
opinion and reputation evidence, convictions, and prior inconsistent
statements. 74 Unfortunately, these other means of impeachment during
cross-examination are not always available.175 For example, if the witness
that introduces the hearsay statement did not have contact with the
176
declarant, then his answers during cross-examination will not be useful.
Moreover, of all the methods of proving character, evidence of prior
conduct is the most persuasive. 177 If the hearsay opponent is not going to
have the opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant, it is only fair
that he be given full authority to delve into all other manners of
impeachment, subject to Rule 403.

VII. CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES DO NOT AFFECT THE
STANDARD
In a criminal trial there are consequences to the abuse of Rule 806
178

when used "to place otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury.

,

These situations, as well as the admission of extrinsic evidence, should
179
only be subjected to the Rule 403 balancing test.

173
174

See United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2000).
See id.at 221.

"[O]ther avenues for impeaching the hearsay statement remain open. For example, the credibility
of the hearsay declarant-and indeed that of the witness testifying to the hearsay statement may
be impeached with opinion and reputation evidence of character under Rule 608(a), evidence of
criminal convictions under Rule 609, and evidence of prior inconsistent statements under Rule
613."
Id.
175 See United States v. Washington, 263 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 n.5 (D. Conn. 2003) (stating
regardless of the alternatives mentioned in Saada, "no such consolation prize exists for [all]
defendants").
176 See id. (elaborating on why the options listed in Saada are unrealistic in many scenarios).
177 See FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note (opining that prior conduct is the most
persuasive form of evidence).
178 See United States v. Fay, 668 F.2d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v.
Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 497 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied 431 U.S. 918 (1977)) (acknowledging
that litigators cannot introduce inadmissible hearsay without consequences).
179 See United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the court can
decide how to shield the jury by "[w]eighing the value to each co-defendant of being able to
impeach the credibility of the others against the prejudice to each of having his criminal
convictions before the jury . . ."). Here, just as Rule 403 provides, prejudice is the determining
factor in the judge's analysis of scope and admissibility. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (basing
admissibility, in part, on its prejudicial effect).
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A. Background
If the hearsay declarant, or more likely the declarant of a statement
admitted under 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), is the defendant, his character
may be exposed to the jury despite his decision not to testify.' 80 For
example, in a criminal trial, a prosecutor can offer a non-testifying
defendant's admissible hearsay as the admission of a party opponent. 8"
Pursuant to Rule 607, the prosecutor can then impeach his own witness, the
defendant. 18 2 Therefore, a defendant that invokes his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination is not immune from impeachment.'83 These
types of "pretext impeachments," 8 however,
are generally impermissible
4
1
law.
of
principles
other
to
pursuant
Alternatively, one scholar has suggested that the government can
offer damaging non-pretextual testimony of the defendant's out-of-court
statements into evidence and then impeach his own witness, the defendant,
with prior convictions. 85
This does not conform to the parameters
articulated in Rule 806.186 Rule 806 does not include the admission of a
party opponent, e.g., a confession, recognized under the umbrella of Rule
801(d)(2)(A). 18 7 Scenarios exist, however, where a defendant's credibility
may be at risk despite never taking the stand. One of those risks is the
admission of propensity evidence against the defendant.
Propensity evidence is evidence of similar conduct of the accused
180 See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 168-69 (describing a scenario when a hearsay declarant
is subjected to character evidence).
181See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (regulating that a statement is not hearsay when it is an
opposing party's statement and " [t]he statement is offered against an opposing party and: (A)
was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity...").
182 See FED. R. EVID. 607 ("Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack
the witness's credibility."); see also Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 168. These examples were
shown to illustrate that the baseline test for admissibility is Rule 403 and that Rule 608(b) serves
the same exact purpose. Compare FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (adopting analysis to allow evidence
with many similarities to Rule 403), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (creating a baseline balancing test
used to determine evidence's admissibility).
183 See U.S. Const. amend. V. ("No person shall be ...compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself..."); see also Robinson, 783 F.2d at 68; United States v. Bovain, 708
F.2d 606, 613 (1lth Cir. 1983).

184 See United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1479 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Evidence of the
conviction of a codefendant, then- may be used for impeachment but may not be used to establish
the guilt of the defendant.").
185 See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 168-69 (offering an alternate theory of pretext
impeachment).
186 See FED. R. EVID. 806 (excluding expressly Rule 801(a) and (b) from the rule's scope).
18" See id. (illustrating that the rule does not allow for admissions of party opponents). Rule

806's language expressly omits certain hearsay exclusions, which do not give rise to the ability of
the hearsay opponent to cross-examine the declarant. See id.
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on similar occasions that demonstrates, in essence, a disposition of the
accused to commit the underlying offense.188 "Evidence of a crime, wrong,
or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character."'. 8 9 For example, in a criminal case, the prosecution cannot
introduce evidence that the defendant has a history of burglary to show that
it is likely he committed the burglary for which he is on trial; past crimes
cannot be used to prove guilt of a pending charge.1 90 The government will
not use past conduct because it is the proponent of the defendant's
confession; therefore it is counterproductive to ask the jury to disbelieve
the confession based upon prior acts.' 9' These aforementioned scenarios
are not allowed because the purpose is not to discredit the declarant's
credibility, but rather, to persuade the jury to apply the defendant's
convictions as propensity evidence. 92
Although this type of impeachment is generally disallowed, the
court has discretion to admit the evidence for specific purposes which are
explained to the 1jury. 93 In fact, the court "must restrict the evidence to its
proper scope[.],, 94
B. Restriction Through Diction To Avoid the Infliction
In United States v. Bovain, 9z co-defendant John Nichols pled
guilty and testified for the prosecution to out-of-court statements made by
co-defendant Charles Finch. 196 The statements concerned co-defendant
Dean Rickett's drug activity. 197 Next, pursuant to Rule 806, Rickett
attempted to impeach Finch's credibility by introducing records

188 See FED. R. EvyD. 404(b)(1) committee's note (defining propensity evidence); see also
Similar Fact Evidence Definition, WORKING MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW (last visited Dec. 28,

2014), http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDicfionary/S/SimilarFactEvidence.aspx.
189 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
190 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (enumerating exceptions for which the prosecution may
offer the evidence, "[t]his evidence may be admissible for ...proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.").
191See Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 169 (illustrating why the analysis of certain evidentiary

scenarios is not practical).
192

See id.
FED. R. EvyD. 105 ("If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or

193 See

for a purpose but not against another party or for another purpose-the court ... must restrict
the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.").
194 Id. (emphasis added).
195 708 F.2d 606 (11th Cir. 1983).
196 Id. at 608,613.
197 Id. at 608.
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constituting extrinsic evidence of Finch's prior convictions. 198 Finch's
credibility was open to evidentiary support because extrinsic evidence is
permitted to show prior convictions. 199 Then, Finch was forced to defend
his credibility despite his never taking the stand. 0z
If defendants assert
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, they are left with
no alternative to admitting rebuttal evidence 201
The Bovain court instructed the jury that Finch's convictions could
only be used to discredit the accuracy of his statements, not as propensity
evidence attributable to his guilt. 20 2 Alternatively, other judges chose to
"protect the defendants' presumption of innocence by refusing to allow
impeachment with evidence of prior convictions" 203 In both instances, the
courts' decisions were subject to Rule 403.204
VIII. INDECENT PROPOSALS
One scholar suggested that Rule 806 be modified to address and
clarify its nonconformity with Rule 608(b).20 5
Another scholar
recommended that courts should decide whether to admit extrinsic

evidence on a case-by-case basis using a balancing test of factors.20 6 This
suggestion is impractical because it would be too inconsistent, exacerbating
rather than solving the discrepancy. Another ineffective proposal focuses
198 Id. at
199

613.

See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (allowing extrinsic evidence when it concerns prior

convictions); Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613.
200 See Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613; see also FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (discussing the use of
extrinsic evidence to prove prior convictions).
201 See United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir. 1983).
202 See Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613.
"The defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right under our Constitution not to testify. The
fact that Defendant did not testify must not be discussed or considered in any way when
deliberating and in arriving at your verdict. No inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact
that a defendant decided to exercise [his] [her] privilege under the Constitution and did not
testify. As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or
duty of calling any witnesses or of producing any evidence."
O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at §15:14, at 450.
203 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1986).

204 See id. The court always has the option to exclude relevant evidence pursuant to Rule

403, and thus the admission of evidence by the Bovain court implicitly demonstrates the court's
decision that the evidence was not worthy of exclusion for any of the enumerated reasons. Id.;
see also Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613.
205 See Cordray, supra note 116, at 530-31 (proposing an amendment to Rule 806).
206 See Hornstein, supra note 165, at 571 (establishing multi-faceted test assessing, "the
importance of the declarant' s statement, [and] the extent to which the misconduct might affect the
fact-finder's assessment of the declarant's veracity because of the nature of the misconduct or its
attenuation in time...").
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on the judiciary's understanding-or lack of understanding-of what
classifies as extrinsic evidence.20 7 The argument contends that Rule 806
allows the opponent of the hearsay statement to attack a non-testifying
declarant's credibility. 208 Although Rule 806 allows counsel to treat the
testifying witness as the out-of-court declarant for the purposes of
impeachment, it does not specify whether the court should consider the
actual presence of the non-testifying witness.20 9 In other words, should we
imagine that the declarant is there, and give credit to that manifestation to
realize an actual appearance? Alan D. Hornstein argues that the White
court misunderstood extrinsic evidence and "endorsed the admission of
[certain types of] extrinsic evidence[]" rather than entirely banning it
pursuant to Rule 608(b). 210 Fortunately, such a debate is unnecessary.
Neither an amendment to Rule 806, nor an additional balancing
test, nor a dictionary or academic debate, is necessary to resolve this issue.
Currently, courts do not analyze Rule 608(b) very often because of the
restrictions that Rule 403 imposes. If evidence survives the scrutiny of
Rule 403, as well as other relevant rules, it should be admitted into
evidence.
21
IX. STRIKE... "ABOVE, BUT NOT BELOW, THE BELT" '

Rule 806 does not expressly impose a test of probative value.212
Despite its silence, the trial court still must weigh the evidence upon the
judicial scale of relevance and asses the Rule 403 balancing test. 213 The
court decides which questions are appropriate and probative pursuant to
Rule 403.214 Moreover, the court may exclude evidence that is otherwise

207

See Hornstein, supra note 165, at 552 (discussing the perceived misnomer of "extrinsic

evidence" by the court in White); see also United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 920 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (refusing to categorize the cross-examination of a testifying witness regarding the nontestifying hearsay declarant's credibility as extrinsic evidence).
208 See FED. R. EVID. 806.
209 See id.
210 See Hornstein, supra note 165, at 552; see also Sonenshein, supra note 30, at 166 ("Rule
806 impeachment is, by definition, based on extrinsic evidence").
211 See People v. Vasher, 537 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Mich. 1995) (quoting State v. Rollo, 351
P.2d 422, 427 (Or. 1960)) (commenting that Rule 403 bars prejudicial evidence hitting
metaphorically "below the belt").
212 See United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 615-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
213 See FED. R. EvD.401 (defining relevant evidence as making a material fact more or less
probable); Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. at 614; see also Vaugn v. Willis, 853 F.2d 1372, 1379 (7th
Cir. 1988).
214 See Armstrong v. Bair, No. CIV-03-0255-C, 2007 WL 626043, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
23, 2007) (determining the allowance of evidence under Rule 403).
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215
admissible under Rule 608(b) if it fails the Rule 403 balancing test.
Rule 608(b) seeks to avoid confusing the trier of fact and a "minitrial" on the tangential point of a witness's prior conduct resulting in an
undue consumption of time.216 In addition, allowing false allegations of
misconduct would force
the witness to unrealistically defend against every
217
alleged act of his life.

Safeguards exist to avoid such situations. For example, to inquire
into a witness's prior conduct on cross-examination, counsel must first
have a "good faith basis for the question. , 218 Some courts may require
concrete proof before allowing such a line of interrogation. 219 Without the

requirements of good faith and occasionally concrete evidence, courts
would permit a "fishing expedition," resulting in a waste of time for the
court and the parties involved. 220 The evidence, of course, is still subject to
the Rule 403 test that protects against unfair prejudice.2 2 '

215

See id. at *3 (deciding that admitting a judicial decision as extrinsic evidence was

improper to impeach a testifying declarant); see also United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 802
(10th Cir. 1990) (discussing Rule 608(a)); United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570 (2d Cir. 1988))
("determinations of relevance and rulings as to the proper scope of cross-examination, must be
left to the broad discretion of the trial judge . . ."). The court may admit evidence that is
traditionally excluded pursuant to Rule 608(b), however, instances exist where the jury is exposed
to character evidence that must be subject to rebuttal in the interests of justice. See, e.g., United
States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming Judge Miller, who was
interviewed for this article, and permitting extrinsic evidence of drug related conduct because the
defendant testified and inaccurately portrayed himself as a model citizen).
216 See WIGMORE, supra note 116, at §979, at 826; Cordray, supra note 116, at 523; Hale,
supra note 116, at 89-90 (excluding extrinsic evidence because of "(1) confusion of issues; (2)
undue consumption of time; (3) unfair surprise"); see also United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210,
222 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980)); accord United
States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038 (1992) (stating
that the purpose of Rule 608(b) is to avoid mini-trials); Foster v. United States, 282 F.2d 222, 223
(10th Cir. 1960).
217 See WIGMORE,supra note 116, at §979, at 826-27; see also United States v. Banks, 475
F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir. 1973).
218 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 (1948) (suggesting counsel needs a
good faith basis for questions during cross-examination); White v. Coplan, 399 F.3d 18, 25 (1st
Cir. 2005) (declaring an assumption of good faith basis for asking questions is necessary); United
States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 552 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing that a good faith basis is needed for
questions during cross-examination); United States v. Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 971 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996) (developing the principle of good faith basis for inquiring into
incidents during impeachment); O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10, at §6.3, at 573-74 (explaining
the importance of preliminary proceedings to give opposing counsel a forum to oppose certain
questions).
219 See Interview with Senior Judge Thomas J. Whelan, supra note 54 (indicating
circumstances where proof of prior conduct is needed before the Rule 403 test).
220 See id.
221 See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570 (2d Cir. 1988); JONES, ET AL., supra
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Unfair prejudice includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the
jury will unduly weigh more heavily or the inequitable use of such
evidence.222 The court must decide whether a declarant's past conduct
sheds doubt on his credibility. 223
This is done by comparing the
circumstances surrounding the prior conduct with those surrounding the
224
isu sufficiently accomplished with the use of
hearsay statement..
This is
Rule 403.
X. CONCLUSION
An attorney has an ethical obligation to defer to his client in
determining the objectives of the representation as well as how the
objectives will be accomplished.225 With respect to the "technical, legal
and tactical matters," clients often defer to the attorney for his expertise and
knowledge.226 For the attorney to be effective at trial, the necessary tools
2 27
must be available, and at times this requires an adjustment of the rules.
Enforcing the blanket ban on extrinsic evidence would preclude the use of
one of the most important tools for impeachment provided to an attorney,
the introduction of prior conduct.228 Rule 806 serves to provide equal
ground between live witnesses and non-testifying hearsay declarants,
avoiding a net gain to the proponent who otherwise escapes impeachment,
"and a net loss for the fact-finding process.'' 9 This is only possible,
however, if Rule 608(b) is ignored.
Rule 806 establishes its own rule for admissibility, subject to the
balancing test of Rule 403. Rule 806 intends to modify the ban on extrinsic
evidence imposed by Rule 608(b), allowing extrinsic evidence of specific
acts for impeachment. 230 The Third and D.C. Circuits have erred in

note 27, at §8:3285.
222

See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at §806:1 (citing People v. Mills, 537 N.W.2d 909, 917

(Mich. 1995)). In addition_ Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment. See FED. R.
Evm. 611 (a)(3).
223 See United States v. Uvino, 590 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Friedman,
854 F.2d at 570).
224 See id.
225 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983).
226 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1983).

227 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 841 (3rd ed. 2014).
228

See Cordray, supra note 116, at 525 (stressing the necessity of presenting prior conduct

for impeachment purposes).
229 See Sonenshein_ supra note 30, at 164.
230 See generally Cordray, supra note 116, at 522 (suggesting that it is possible that Rule 806
modifies Rule 608(b) because "Rule 806 could be understood to allow the general type of
impeachment authorized in Rule 608(b), making allowances for necessary alterations in form");
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enforcing the ban on extrinsic evidence. The rules and their legislative
intent demonstrate that Rule 608(b) should not apply in concert with Rule
806.
The solution is to strike Rule 608(b) from the Federal Rules of
Evidence because it seeks to avoid the same trials and tribulations
prevented by Rule 403. It does not matter if the declarant is unavailable
because there are too many extenuating circumstances regarding
incrimination and refusal to testify, creating more problems. Attempting to
decipher and filter through these scenarios is itself an undue burden, waste
of time, and cause for confusion to the courts and counsel, because the rule
itself is not needed. Because admissibility under Rule 403 is an adequately
limiting fact intensive decision, 23 judicial economy, as well as relative trial
prediction and consistency in the rules of evidence, can be accomplished by
striking Rule 608(b). To serve the interests of justice, courts should
dispose of the limits placed upon relevant extrinsic evidence for
impeachment purposes imposed by Rule 608(b), particularly when applied
in conjunction with Rule 806.232

see also Hornstein, supra note 165, at 556-58 (citing United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 21920 (3d Cir. 2000)) (explaining the government's argument to the court).
231 Interview with Senior Judge Jeffrey T. Miller, supra note 54.
232 See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at §8.96; see also Taylor v. State, 963 A.2d
197, 211, 213 (Md. 2009) (reversing conviction because defendant should have been permitted to
impeach hearsay declarant with evidence of unconvicted acts pertaining to veracity); State v.
Martisko, 566 S.E.2d 274, 276 (W.Va. 2002) (permitting extrinsic evidence in the form of a prior
complaint).

